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INTRODUCTION
Presumably there is widespread acceptance for the notion of
freedom of contract as a fundamental part of our legal, government
and economic systems., In at least a general way, the freedom of, or
liberty to, contract is enshrined as a right.2 Likewise, few would ques-
tion that this freedom is subject to certain limitations under common
law as well as modern constitutional jurisprudence.3 Questions re-
volve around the contours of this right and particularly the extent to
* Michael Pillow is a Visiting Instructor of Law at Florida A&M University College of
Law. He holds a J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh Law School and a B.A. from the
University of Virginia. The author expresses his appreciation for the sage counsel, specific
comments, and continuing encouragement provided by Professor Richard Hurt of the FAMU
College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Rowe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 385 N.E.2d 566, 569 (N.Y. 1978).
See generally JAMES E. MuRAy, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTs, § 350, at 735-736 (2d ed. 1974)
[hereinafter MURRAY]. Numerous articles have delved into both the history of, and more
modem approaches to, freedom of contract. See generally Carolyn Edwards, Freedom Of
Contract And Fundamental Fairness For Individual Parties: The Tug Of War Continues, 77
UMKC L. REv. 647 (2009) [hereinafter Edwards].
2. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). See also Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 760 (1997) (Souter, J. concurring), quoting Allgeyer v. Lousiana, 165 U.S. 578,
589 (1897).
3. Frisbee v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1895). As to common law limits, see,
e.g., Edwards, supra note 1, at 655-657. The constitutional limits were clearly explicated in
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See also Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 958-961 (1992) (Rehnquist, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
which this right emanates from or is protected under the United States
Constitution.
This article reconsiders the constitutional dimensions of free-
dom of contract as applied to potential decisions, regulations or
restrictions by states under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.4 This article's essential premise is that freedom of contract
merits some degree of constitutional due process protection. In some
contexts, this protection may only be procedural. Case law lends some
support to this premise.5 In other contexts, this seemingly precious
freedom should be considered so integral that substantive due process
applies.
The author does not propose an expansion of due process rights
for breaches of contract. That topic has been explored in considerable
detail elsewhere.6 The article also does not advocate resurrection of
the approaches used during what constitutional scholars have long
dubbed "the Lochner era."7 The principal concern here is to ensure a
sufficient bulwark against laws, doctrines or policies, including judicial
decisions that hamper parties, especially businesses and other sophis-
ticated parties, from freely negotiating commercial contract provisions.
I. COMMON LAw CONTRACT RIGHTS
Common law generally intends to enforce contracts freely en-
tered by competent persons.8 This general rule is subject to traditional
common law exceptions, such as illegality, duress, fraud and mistake.9
Freedom of contract derives from philosophical perspectives that un-
4. The principal concern here is with state rather than federal actions with respect to
contracts; hence the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is not addressed.
5. See infra notes 42-73 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Leonard Kreynin, Breach of Contract as a Due Process Violation: Can the
Constitution be a Font of Contract Law?, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1098 (1990).
7. The name of this era derives from the famous or infamous case of Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 298 U.S. 525 (1923).
Countless thorough and provocative articles have been written concerning the history and
current treatment of Lochner. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The
Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CAL. L.
REV. 751 (June 2009) [hereinafter Noursel; David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism,
Revised: Lochner and The Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1
(2003). Scholars dispute the exact time period of the "Lochner era," but generally place it
from the 1890s to 1937. See Nourse, 97 CAL. L. REv. at 754, n.16.
8. MURRAY, supra note 1, at 735-736; see also, JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,




derpin the common law.10 American courts have normally refrained
from refusing to enforce even "bad" deals absent one of these defenses.
"This reluctance can be explained by the widespread acceptance of a
view of contractual freedom that was predicated on an expansive con-
ception of individual rights. This conception of freedom attempted to
demarcate a sphere within which the individual could act without in-
terference by the state. The laissez-faire policies of the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries reflect this concept of freedom.""
The rule of general enforceability is also limited by the more
modern doctrine of unconscionability, as most famously delineated in
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").1 2 This doctrine
has roots in the equity or chancery courts, where equitable concepts of
unfairness carried more weight.13 The vagueness of this provision has
been much discussed and often criticized. 14 Fortunately, courts have
taken a restrictive approach to the amorphous doctrine of unconsciona-
bility. Consistent with the historical origins of the UCC provision,
most courts require a finding of both procedural unconscionability (ab-
sence of meaningful choice) and substantive unconscionability (unfair
or adhesive terms).15 In upholding a ruling against a claim of uncon-
scionability, Judge Posner aptly summarized the concerns in Amoco
Oil Company v. Ashcraft:16
There can be no objection to using the one-sidedness of a transac-
tion as evidence of deception, lack of agreement, or compulsion,
none of which has been shown here. The problem with unconsciona-
bility as a legal doctrine comes in making sense out of lack of
"meaningful choice" in a situation where the promisor was not
deceived or compelled and really did agree to the provision that he
contends was unconscionable. Suppose that for reasons unrelated
to any conduct by the promisee the promisor has very restricted op-
portunities. Maybe he is so poor that he can be induced to sell the
clothes off his back for a pittance, or is such a poor credit risk that
he can be made (in the absence of usury laws) to pay an extraordi-
narily high interest rate to borrow money that he wants
10. Philip Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of Unconscionability,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1518 (2003).
11. Id. at 1518, 1519.
12. U.C.C. § 2-302.
13. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 528-529 (1967).
14. Id. at 488. See also M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L. J.
757 (1969); Symposium, Unconscionability: An Attempt at Definition, 31 U. Pirr. L. REV.
333 (1970).
15. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965); see also, Leff, supra note 13.
16. Amoco Oil Company v. Asheraft, 791 F. 2d 519 (7th Cir. 1986).
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desperately. Does he have a "meaningful choice" in such circum-
stances? If not he may actually be made worse off by a rule of
nonenforcement of hard bargains; for, knowing that a contract with
him will not be enforced, merchants may be unwilling to buy his
clothes or lend him money. Since the law of contracts cannot compel
the making of contracts on terms favorable to one party, but can
only refuse to enforce contracts with unfavorable terms, it is not an
institution well designed to rectify inequalities in wealth . . . . This
may be why Indiana is so unfriendly to the defense of
unconscionability.17
Additional common law exceptions to enforceability have
evolved through case-by-case adjudication, especially during the twen-
tieth and twenty-first centuries. Some contract clauses may be
considered unenforceable on the ground that they violate public policy
or the public interest.18 These standards may not be easy to ascertain
and are certainly subject to variation. In addition, statutes ranging
from antitrust laws to consumer protection laws set restraints on abso-
lute freedom of contract.19 , Inasmuch as they are codified, statutory
restrictions should at least be easy to discern, even if not always easy
to interpret.
Certain types of contract clauses invite stricter scrutiny than
others. For example, forum selection clauses are often contested as a
means for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant where it
otherwise might not exist. 20 The enforceability of forum selection
clauses confronts arguments that courts lack personal jurisdiction over
the defendant consistent with due process. 21 Federal courts tend to
favor enforcement of such clauses, provided that the clauses are suffi-
ciently clear, and no other reason for non-enforcement is established. 22
The Supreme Court has opined that forum selection clauses
should be invalidated only if they violate "fundamental fairness."23 As
one federal appellate court stated, "[freedom of contract requires no
less." 2 4 State court decisions may tend more toward striking forum se-
17. Id. at 522 (citation omitted).
18. See, e.g., Kalisch-Jarcho v. City of N.Y., 448 N.E.2d 413, 417-18 (1983). Md. Nat'1
Cap. P. & P. v. Wash. Nat'l Arena, 386 A.2d 1216 (1978). See generally MURRAY, supra note
1, §334 at 703; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195.
19. Examples include the Sherman Act, 15 USC §1 et seq. (2012) and the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, 15 USC §2301 et seq. (2011).
20. See, e.g., Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); IFC Credit Corp. v. Allano Bros. General
Contractors, 437 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2006).
21. See, e.g., IFC Credit Corp., 437 F.3d at 608.
22. MIS Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
23. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991).
24. IFC Credit Corp., 437 F.3d at 610.
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lection clauses, especially in circumstances involving form contracts or
inexperienced parties.25
Arbitration provisions are often contested, especially in the em-
ployment context. 26 Federal law and policy endorse the use of
arbitration as a means to relieve court congestion. 27 In commercial
contracts, arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution provi-
sions are typically enforceable. 28 Courts have expressed some
reluctance, however, to extend the policy to situations where one con-
tracting party is essentially forced to accept an unfair provision, such
as in many employment contracts. 29 These situations are analogous to
the concerns underlying the unconscionability doctrine.
Exculpatory clauses may also receive heightened scrutiny.
Under the common law, courts often refuse to enforce exculpatory
clauses in contracts where enforcement would violate public policy.30
Section 195 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts addresses such
exemptions from liability.3 1 Under that section, terms exempting a
party from tort liability caused by intentional or reckless conduct (and
in some cases negligent conduct) are unenforceable on public policy
grounds. 32 Typically, public policy grounds may include actions that
are considered willful or even grossly negligent.33 Other courts have
added a related exception for contracts that are intrinsically tied to the
public interest.34
These "public policy" or "public interest" concepts are often ap-
plied to limitation of liability provisions, as opposed to clauses that
exempt or exculpate a party from any liability.35 Although concep-
tually different, in many cases, exculpation and limitation can
25. See, e.g., Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Power Eng'g Group, Inc., 860 N.E. 2d 741 (Ohio
2007); Calanca v. D & S Mfg. Co., 510 N.E. 2d 21, 23 (Ill. 1987).
26. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
27. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC § 2; Southland Corp. v, Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
28. Id.
29. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the Supreme Court
held that an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim was subject to arbitration
pursuant to a clause in a stock registration agreement. One must look to the particular
state or federal claim to ascertain whether an arbitration clause will be upheld.
30. See, e.g., Kalisch-Jarcho v. City of N.Y., 448 N.E.2d 413 (N.Y. 1983); Wolf v. Ford,
335 Md. 525, 644 A.2d 522 (1994).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Kalisch-Jarcho,448 N.E.2d at 417-18.
34. See Md. Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Wash. Nat'l Arena, 386 A.2d
1216 (Md. 1978); Wolf v. Ford, 644 A. 2d 522 (Mass. 1994).
35. See, e.g., Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365 (N.Y. 1992).
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accomplish similar objectives or results. 3 6 As with unconscionability,
courts generally show restraint in striking down provisions on such
grounds. 37 This is especially true with respect to limitations that are
not truly exculpatory, such as consequential damages disclaimers. 38
The context, whether it be commercial or consumer, influences the out-
come inasmuch as the parties' relative bargaining power represents an
important factor for courts to consider.39 This is explicitly true under
the Uniform Commercial Code. 40
In short, the common law emphasizes freedom of contract with
some limitations. The common law evolution reflected prevailing phil-
osophical and economic approaches. This evolution paralleled
Supreme Court results striking down various legislative acts on sub-
stantive due process grounds.4 '
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
The concept of liberty of contract as a constitutional right flour-
ished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 42 According
to Professor Bernstein, "the basic motivation for Lochnerian jurispru-
dence was the Justices' belief that Americans had fundamental
unenumerated constitutional rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause protected those rights."43 Liberty or freedom of
contract represented one such natural right.44
In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish45, the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the use of a "substantive due process" right to freedom of con-
tract as a basis for overturning various pieces of New Deal
legislation. 46 The Court expressly overruled Adkins v. Children's Hos-
pital47 and, in doing so, indirectly overturned many of the Lochner era
36. Great N. Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Serv., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 723 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
37. Wash. Nat'l Arena, 386 A.2d at 1227-28.
38. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp., 685 F.
Supp. 1281 (D.N.H. 1981).
39. See, e.g., K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 263 A.2d 390, 393 (Pa. 1970);
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 13-11 at 710.
40. See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2003).
41. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42. Bernstein, supra note 7, at 15-16.
43. Id. at 12.
44. Id. at 45.
45. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See also Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 958-961 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
47. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 298 U.S. 525 (1923).
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cases.48 Even before West Coast Hotel, the Supreme Court recognized
that freedom of contract remained subject to reasonable regulation
under a state's police power.4 9 West Coast Hotel and its progeny left
little doubt that the freedom of any person or entity to contract no
longer enjoyed an ascendant perch under the Constitution. As one fed-
eral appellate court later noted, "plaintiffs bringing substantive due
process challenges to [economic] statutes must traverse unusually in-
hospitable legal terrain because the Supreme Court has not
invalidated an economic statute on substantive due process grounds
since . .. 1935."o5 Since freedom of contract does not qualify as a fun-
damental right, regulation involving it will only trigger a "rational
basis" test that most statutes and other actions routinely pass.51
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has continued to ac-
knowledge the fundamental nature of the liberty to contract as a
component of substantive due process review. 52 As Justice Souter es-
poused, the due process conception of liberty
in the aftermath of the so-called Lochner Era has been scaled back
in some respects, but expanded in others, and never repudiated in
principle. The Court said that Fourteenth Amendment liberty in-
cludes "the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue
any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carry-
ing out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned."5 3
Moreover, the Supreme Court's extension of the due process clause to
protect an unenumerated right to privacy 54 suggests that non-textual
rights can be deserving of protection.55
Several cases have recognized a right to procedural due process
prior to termination of employment contracts.56 In Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth,5 7 the Supreme Court described the "liberty" pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment as follows:
48. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400.
49. Bernstein, supra note 7, at 45.
50. Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. (In re Blue Diamond
Coal Co.), 79 F.3d 516, 521 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted).
51. See, e.g., Harrah Indep. School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198 (1979).
52. Washington v. Glucksberg, supra, 521 U.S. 702, 760 (1997) (Souter, J. concurring).
53. Id. (quoting Allgeyer v. Lousiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)) (emphasis added).
54. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
55. Bernstein, supra note 7, at 56.
56. See Breach as Due Process, supra note 6, at 1101-1102.
57. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men.5 8
The Supreme Court also recognized that contracts might give
rise to property interests that would be afforded due process protec-
tion.5 9 Property interests are defined by an independent source such
as state law.6 0 Ultimately, the Roth Court held that the University did
not violate the plaintiff professor's due process by refusing to renew his
one-year contract, since he had not acquired a "right" to renewal.61
Likewise, the University did not violate any liberty interest since the
professor remained free to pursue opportunities without any stigmas
or disabilities. 62
By way of contrast, in the companion case to Roth, Perry v.
Sindermann,63 the Supreme Court held that a non-tenured professor
may be able to establish a sufficient property interest by virtue of un-
derstandings, policies or practices that amounted to de facto tenure. 64
The case was remanded to allow the plaintiff to offer evidence of such
understandings, policies or practices which might entitle him to job
tenure under Texas law65 . If successful, the plaintiff would be afforded
a hearing regarding the reasons for his dismissal.66
One reason for limiting the reach of the due process clause with
respect to contracts results from a textual interpretation of the Consti-
tution.67 As previously indicated, the Bill of Rights contains no express
protection for the liberty to contract. The "Contracts" Clause of the
Constitution states that "[n]o State shall . . . pass any . .. Law impair-
ing the Obligation of Contracts."68 Although this clause was
58. Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 576-77.
60. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982).
61. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
62. Id. at 573-574.
63. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
64. Id. at 601-603. The Court suggested that "there may be an unwritten 'common law'
in a particular university that certain employees shall have the equivalent of tenure."
65. Id. at 602-603.
66. Id. at 603. As in Roth, the professor claimed improper termination due to his
exercise of free speech rights.
67. Kreynin, supra note 6, at 1108.
68. U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 10.
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principally directed to revolutionary debts,6 9 it provides a constitu-
tional protection that may be invoked to redress state infringements of
contract rights.70
As the Supreme Court stated in Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus,7 1 "the Contract Clause receded into comparative desuetude
with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly with
the development of the large body of jurisprudence under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of that Amendment in modern constitutional history."72 In
overturning the application of Minnesota's Private Pension Benefits
Protection Act to the appellant's contractual pension obligations, the
Court recognized the constitutional vitality of contracts:
The severity of an impairment of contractual obligations can be
measured by the factors that reflect the high value the Framers
placed on the protection of private contracts. Contracts enable indi-
viduals to order their personal and business affairs according to
their particular needs and interests. Once arranged, those rights
and obligations are binding under the law, and the parties are enti-
tled to rely on them.73
The Court's decision in Spannaus confirmed the potential via-
bility of the Contracts Clause, but did not generate a tidal wave of
litigation rivaling due process cases.7 4 Even under that opinion's stan-
dards, the impairment must be substantial or severe.75 The Spannaus
decision involved a divided Supreme Court. Justice Brennan penned a
vigorous dissent, in which he also negated any possible due process
violation associated with the Minnesota law.7 6 Spannaus represents
the only case in decades that has struck down a law impairing a con-
tract between private parties.7 7 The Contracts Clause thus quite
remains limited in its reach.7 8
The Spannaus decision nevertheless reinforces several key
points relative to freedom of contract. First, the Framers of our Consti-
69. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 256 (1978) (Brennan, J.
dissenting) (citation omitted).
70. Although the Takings Clause could also be discussed, that addresses "property"
more directly rather than contracts.
71. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
72. Id. at 241.
73. Id. at 245. The Supreme Court characterized the impact as "sudden, totally
unanticipated and substantially retroactive."
74. See, e.g., State of Nev. Employees Ass'n. v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1990).
75. Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 244-45.
76. Id. at 251.
77. State of Nev. Employees Ass'n. v. Keating, 903 F.2d at 1226.
78. Id.
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tution recognized the value and importance of protecting private
contracts against state actions, as James Madison made clear in the
Federalist Papers.7 9 This historical perspective makes it somewhat
easier to understand why the Supreme Court used freedom of contract
as a basis for striking down laws that threatened freedom of contract
through the Lochner era.80 Simply put, constitutional protection for
freedom of contract is not a new concept. Second, parties who have
entered contracts should be able to rely on their enforceability. This
can be seen as the flip side to the freedom to enter into contracts ini-
tially. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Contracts Clause
only indirectly affects the freedom of contract, since it pertains solely to
existing contracts.8 1
III. LIBERTY AND PROPERTY INTERESTS
As the foregoing decisions indicate, the freedom to contract po-
tentially implicates two separate due process interests: liberty and
property. The recent case of EJS Properties, LLC v. City of Toledo8 2
helps illustrate how these interests are adjudicated in practice. In EJS
Properties, the plaintiff claimed that re-zoning actions by the City of
Toledo and an individual City commissioner violated its procedural
and substantive due process rights8 3  It asserted both liberty and
property interests arising from certain contracts associated with the
real property for which it sought re-zoning.84 The district court
granted summary judgment on all of the constitutional claims and the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.8 5
The EJS Properties court recognized that both the right to con-
tract and interests created by contracts represented "property" under
Ohio law, thus both rights are potentially subject to due process protec-
tion.86 The particular contract interests of the developer plaintiff,
however, amounted to contingent interests, inasmuch as the contin-
79. See generally, THE FEDERALIST, No. 4 (James Madison).
80. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
81. Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 241.
82. EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 2012).
83. Id. at 854.
84. Id. at 855.
85. Id. at 851.
86. Id. at 857. The court cited a prior Sixth Circuit decision, Mertik v. Blalock, 983
F.2d 1353 (6th Cir. 1993), which in turn quoted language from Joseph Bros. Co. v. Brown,
415 N.E. 2d 979, 990 (1979) indicating that the right to contract was specifically guaranteed




gency was subject to the discretionary zoning action of the City of
Toledo. 7 Such interests did not qualify as "property" under Ohio
law.8 8 The court acknowledged that "[t]he right to contract is a long-
recognized liberty interest."89 It characterized the developer's vague
argument as a "right to be free from government interference with the
occurrence of a wholly discretionary condition precedent."90 It con-
cluded that since the contracts were freely entered, no constitutionally
protected liberty interest had been identified.91
Another Sixth Circuit decision, American Express Travel Rel.
Servs. v. Kentucky, 92 likewise refused to find a substantive due process
violation involving a challenge to a 2008 statutory amendment short-
ening the presumptive period of abandonment of unclaimed traveler's
checks. 93 The appellate court employed the "rational basis" test for
constitutionality, which it concluded had been mis-applied by the dis-
trict court. 9 4 The court found that the 2008 amendment satisfied due
process requirements because it was rationally related to Kentucky's
legitimate state interest in assuming possession of abandoned
property.9 5
The bulk of the cases asserting due process rights have arisen
in two contexts: public (primarily academic) employment and govern-
ment contracts.96 Courts have recognized a narrow right to procedural
due process, assuming that a "property right" or "entitlement" has
been established.9 7 This amounts to protection of existing contracts
more than it amounts to "freedom of contract." If a plaintiff gets a
hearing, or a chance to litigate an alleged breach, it receives all the
process that is due.98 Some courts have flatly rejected any notion that
commercial contracts merit due process protection.99
87. EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 858 (6th Cir. 2012).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 859.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. American Express Travel Rel. Servs. v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2011).
93. Id. at 686.
94. Id. at 690.
95. Id. at 693.
96. See Breach as Due Process, supra note 6, at 1101.
97. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see generally, Breach
of Due Process, supra note 6.
98. Kay v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 2008)
(opportunity to litigate breach of contract claim provides all process due).
99. See Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1990); S&D Maint. Co. v.
Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 965-966 (2d Cir. 1988).
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Despite language endorsing the notion of "freedom of contract"
in various cases as mentioned above, few if any modern cases actually
elevate this freedom to a constitutional right.100 This reflects the oft-
stated policy concern with constitutionalizing contract law.101
IV. PROTECTING A LIMITED LIBERTY
On a theoretical plane, if freedom of contract is a cherished
right that does not emanate from the Constitution, what is its source?
Is this freedom simply part of the common law inherent in our system?
Certainly, the Framers recognized the importance of protecting con-
tract obligations, as reflected in the Contracts Clause. One might even
consider freedom of contract one of Justice Harlan's "basic values im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty."102 As one commentator has
suggested that "[miore than any other species of property short of re-
alty and personalty, contract interests definitionally fall within the due
process clause's protection. They are always more than indefinite uni-
lateral expectations, and they always a step away from being converted
into indisputable property interests such as money, goods or
judgments.10 3
One can envision scenarios where the need for recourse would
manifest itself. Suppose that a state passed a law prospectively re-
stricting companies from limiting their liability in any contract. Worse
yet, imagine if a state prescribed certain contract forms for categories
of commercial transactions. Rather than companies' pre-printed
forms, parties would be relegated to state-supplied pre-printed forms.
This sounds contrary to capitalism and free enterprise, and would
probably never occur. On the other hand, many the concept of uncon-
scionability generated significant interest and concern when it was
introduced into Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 104
Would such laws be constitutional? Since these laws would not
affect existing contracts, substantive due process would serve as the
only constitutional basis for a challenge. Under the current state of
the law, a party challenging such laws would bear a strong burden of
100. Again, this stems from the ruling in West Coast Hotel, supra note 45. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 957 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.
dissenting).
101. See, e.g., Breach as Due Process, supra note 6, at 1102.
102. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Justice Harlan concurring).
103. Kreynin, supra note 6, at 1107.
104. See, e.g. Leff, supra note 13, at 486.
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demonstrating no rational basis.los It seems relatively easy to conjure
up justifications for such laws, such as consumer protection or easing
burdens on the court system, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly
indicated that it will not substitute its judgment for that of the legisla-
ture. 1 0 6 The simple answer is that a challenge would almost certainly
be unsuccessful. Freedom of contract would be substantially affected,
without any remedy or solution.
The primary concern of this author, however, lies with court de-
cisions where a court overturns a negotiated provision, such as a
limitation of liability, on public policy grounds. In the final analysis,
the author submits that protecting freedom of contract in these scena-
rios relies on judicial restraint. Those cases limiting the doctrine of
unconscionability or restricting the types of public policies or public
interests that can render a provision unenforceable provide excellent
examples.107 If courts do not exercise such restraint, their decisions
might disrupt freedom of contract, but the affected parties presumably
receive due process via the court proceedings themselves, 08 accompa-
nied of course by a right to appeal. 09 This differs from the legislative
or executive actions that are more commonly challenged in the courts.
In other words, the only recourse for a judicial deprivation of due pro-
cess is exhaustion of the judicial process.
Even if freedom of contract were considered a right entitled to
constitutional protection, it is impossible at this juncture to conceive
that it could ever attain "fundamental right" status for substantive due
process purposes.1 10 The best that one could hope for is "rational ba-
sis" review. That being said, the Supreme Court has also
demonstrated that even a "rational basis" review can sometimes be in-
voked to protect a liberty interest based on substantive due process.'11
Recognition of the right, accompanied by at least rational scrutiny,
105. See, e.g., American Exp. Tray. Servs. Co., v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685, 694 (6th Cir.
2011) (referring to a "heavy burden").
106. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel, supra note 45 at 399.
107. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Kay v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 547 F. 3d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 2008)
(opportunity to litigate breach of contract claim provides all process due).
109. See generally Craig W. Hillwig, Comment, Giving Property All the Process That's
Due: A "Fundamental" Misunderstanding About Due Process, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 726
(1992).
110. See, e.g, DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. County of DeKalb, Ga., 106 F. 3d 956, 959 n. 6 (11th
Cir. 1997) (fundamental rights are created only by the Constitution); McKinney v. Pate, 20
F. 3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (substantive due process protection limited to "most"
provisions in the Bill of Rights and certain penumbras).
111. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The nature of the liberty to contract
differs markedly from the type of liberty interests acknowledged in Lawrence v. Texas and
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might further ensure that courts more clearly determine that "public
policies" truly exist before disrupting negotiated contracts along with
the underlying "liberty" to enter into such contracts.
CONCLUSION
Freedom of contract merits more than mere words. It repre-
sents an essential component of our liberty. Contracts also establish
rights and interests, which may fall short of the "entitlement" charac-
terization necessary to establish a constitutionally protected property
interest.11 2 This author is not advocating the injection of due process
review into every case involving contract interpretation or breach.
Parties should be able to negotiate and sign contracts, however, know-
ing that courts will likely enforce their terms with only limited
exceptions. While courts have by and large refrained from interfering
with parties' bargains, exceptions based on amorphous conceptions of
public policy arguably go beyond the well-accepted common law excep-
tions for enforceability.113 Acknowledgement of a due process right
would at least reinforce restraint.
the cases upon which it relied. See Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental
Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REV 1893, 1933-1940 (2004).
112. See generally Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
113. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
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